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V 
ietnam’s banking sector is expected to have 
one of the highest growth rates in Asia during 
the next few years due to the country’s continued 
economic expansion, rising household incomes, and 
relatively low penetration of existing banking ser-
vices.  Over the past two decades, the Vietnamese 
government has undertaken a series of reforms to 
strengthen and modernize the sector as part of the 
country’s move towards a more open and market-
oriented economy.  Many of these reforms have 
also been motivated by Vietnam’s growing partici-
pation in international agreements and ongoing ef-
forts to adopt international standards such as the 
Basel capital framework.  Key reforms include a 
restructuring of the banking system, a gradual open-
ing to foreign investment, the partial privatization 
of state-owned banking institutions, and measures 
to strengthen the capitalization of Vietnamese 
banks.   This Asia Focus report provides an over-
view of Vietnam’s banking sector, reviews signifi-
cant developments since the mid 1980s, and high-
lights key challenges to reform implementation. 
 
Profile of the Banking Sector 
Rapid Growth 
Vietnam’s banking sector has expanded substan-
tially in recent years.  Total domestic assets in the 
system more than doubled between 2007 and 2010, 
growing from VND 1,097 trillion (USD 52.4 bil-
lion) to VND 2,690 trillion (USD 128.7 billion).
2  
This figure is expected to grow to VND 3,667 
(USD 175.4 billion) by the end of 2012.
3 
 
Rapid economic growth has contributed to rising 
household incomes and an increasing demand for 
retail banking services.  Credit and debit card use 
has become more common, with the number of 
cards issued doubling between 2008 and 2010 to 
28.5 million.  The number of automated teller ma-
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  chines (ATMs) has also climbed dramatically, rising from 
1,800 in 2005 to 11,000 as of December 2010.
4   Yet de-
spite this growth, banking penetration rates remain rela-
tively low.  As of December 2009, an estimated 20% of 
Vietnam’s population had bank accounts and around half 
of those with accounts actively used consumer banking 
services.
5  Although these figures have likely risen some-
what during 2010 given the rising trend in credit cards 
and ATMs, the Vietnamese market continues to present 
growth opportunities for banking service providers. 
 
Types of Institutions 
The banking sector in Vietnam is divided into four pri-
mary types of institutions (Figure 1 on previous page).  
These include six state-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBs), 37 joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs), five 




SOCBs are majority government-owned institutions that 
the government initially established to fulfill a specialized 
policy lending function.  SOCBs’ traditional customer 
base has been state-owned enterprises (SOEs), although 
they are increasingly expanding into more traditional 
commercial banking activities and are no longer consid-
ered formal policy institutions.
7  Nevertheless, heavy 
lending to SOEs by SOCBs—notably prior to the 1997-98 
Asian Financial Crisis—has led to relatively higher levels 
of non-performing loans (NPLs) than at other financial 
institutions.
8  SOCBs accounted for the largest share of 
lending, with 49.3% of total loans as of year-end 2010, 
down from 58.4% in 2007 (Figure 2).  
 
JSCBs have more diversified shareholding structures than 
SOCBs, with both public and private shareholders. They 
specialize in lending to small- and medium-sized enter-
prise clients and in retail finance.  JSCBs’ market share 
has grown in recent years, due mainly to market share 
captured from the SOCBs.
9  Together with joint 
venture and wholly foreign-owned banks, they ac-
count for slightly more than half of total domestic 
lending as of end-2010 (Figure 2).  
 
Joint venture banks are established with capital con-
tributed by a Vietnamese bank and one or more for-
eign banks under a joint venture contract.  The share 
of foreign investment in the joint venture is limited 
to 49%.  Joint venture banks’ activities are not re-
stricted and are similar in nature to those of JSCBs. 
  
Since 2006, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) has 
granted licenses to five foreign banks to operate as 
wholly foreign-owned banks.  In their limited years 
of operation, the wholly foreign-owned banks have 
reported profits, in part due to high demand by for-
eign investors in Vietnam to open accounts with 
foreign banks and to use their trade finance and for-
eign exchange services.  These banks have also 
looked to the growing Vietnamese middle class as 
potential customers for services in which foreign 
banks are perceived as having a competitive advan-
tage over domestic banks, such as retail banking and 
wealth management services.    
 
Profile of the Banking Sector 
Early reforms to Vietnam’s banking sector were 
part of the broader set of market-oriented reforms 
that the government began implementing in the 
mid-1980s. A number of these reforms focused on 
decentralizing and privatizing financial activities.   
Prior to 1990, the SBV functioned as both a central 
bank and a commercial bank.  The 1990 Ordinance 
on the State Bank of Vietnam separated the central 
bank’s functions and delegated its banking activities 
to four newly created SOCBs, each targeting a dif-
ferent sector of the economy.
10  The central bank’s 
Figure 2: Vietnam Banking Sector Loans by Institution Type (VND, trillions) 
   2007  2008  2009  2010 
SOCB Lending  623  763  982  1221 
     (SOCB % of total)  58.4%  57.0%  52.5%  49.3% 
Joint Stock and Other Bank Lending  444  576  887  1254 
     (Joint Stock and Other as % of total)  41.6%  43.0%  47.5%  50.7% 
Total  1,067  1,339  1,869  2,475 
Source: International Monetary Fund and ASEAN Economic Bulletin industrial and commercial lending department was 
converted to the Vietnam Industrial and Commercial 
Bank (formerly Incombank, now Vietinbank), its agri-
cultural department to the Viet Nam Bank for Agri-
culture and Rural Development (Agribank), its inter-
national trade department to the Bank for Foreign 
Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank), and its infrastruc-
ture department to the Bank for Investment and De-
velopment of Viet Nam (BIDV).   The SBV’s role 
was narrowed to that of a central bank, including the 
formulation of monetary policy, management of for-
eign exchange reserves, and licensing and supervision 
of “credit institutions,” a term that encompasses com-
mercial banks.
11  The government also permitted the 
establishment of JSCBs and a limited foreign bank 
presence through joint-venture banks and foreign 
bank branches, which were restricted to engaging in 
certain types of activities.
12 
 
Many of Vietnam’s more recent banking sector re-
forms have been motivated in part by the country’s 
entry into international trade and investment agree-
ments, such as the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (BTA) in 2001, and its accession to the 
WTO in 2007.  The resulting increased presence of 
foreign banks has prompted additional reforms to en-
hance the competitiveness and strength of domestic 
banks, including the SOCBs.  These reforms include 
partially privatizing the SOCBs and strengthening 
bank capitalization.  Efforts to bolster banks’ capital 
bases are also aimed at achieving compliance with the 
international capital standards under the Basel capital 
accords. 
 
Increased Presence of Foreign Banks 
Vietnam started gradually opening its banking sector 
to foreign investment in the early 1990s, as discussed 
above. A foreign bank’s access was initially limited to 
taking a minority share in joint venture banks and es-
tablishing branches and representative offices until 
2004, when the government amended the 1998 Law 
on Credit Institutions to comply with the terms of the 
U.S.-Vietnam BTA.  This amendment required Viet-
nam to allow 100% U.S.-owned subsidiary banks by 
2010.
13  The amendments to the law set the stage for 
the establishment of wholly foreign-owned banks by 
investors from any country, which would eventually 




In 2006, the government issued a decree specifying 
the requirements for establishing wholly foreign-
owned banks and regulating the general operation of 
foreign bank branches and joint venture banks.  The 
decree required foreign banks applying for a wholly 
foreign-owned banking license to have at least USD 
20 billion in assets in the year prior to application 
and required a single parent bank to own at least 
50% of the new bank’s capital.
15  The decree also 
relaxed restrictions on foreign investment via for-
eign bank branches and joint venture banks by ex-
tending their license periods and by expanding for-
eign branch service transaction points to include 
ATMs, also required under the BTA.
16  Vietnam 
further leveled the playing field for foreign banks 
on January 1, 2011, by granting foreign branches 
equal treatment as domestic banks, complying with 
its WTO commitments.  Foreign branches and do-
mestic banks are now subject to the same deposit 
and lending rules and are permitted to provide the 
same banking services. 
 
Partially Privatizing State-Owned Commercial 
Banks 
To complement opening local banking markets to 
foreign players, the government recognized the need 
to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic 
banks.  The government’s plans include the May 
2006 announcement to “equitize,” or partially pri-
vatize, the SOCBs and reduce government owner-
ship to 51% by 2010.
17  To help facilitate this proc-
ess, in 2007 the government raised the maximum 
stake a single strategic foreign investor could hold 
in a domestic commercial bank, including SOCBs, 
from 10% to 15% of the bank’s chartered capital.
18  
The SBV may “in special cases” grant an exception 
to individual strategic foreign investors, allowing 
investment of up to 20% of chartered capital in an 
SOCB.
19  Whatever the level of investment, strate-
gic foreign investors must commit in writing to as-
sisting the domestic bank in developing products 
and services and in improving managerial and tech-
nological capacity.
20  The government capped  non-
strategic foreign financial institutions’ ownership of 
a domestic commercial bank at 10% and all other 
foreign investors’ ownership at 5%.  Total foreign 
ownership of a domestic commercial bank was 
capped at 30%, and the government required inves-tors to hold shares for at least five years to curb share 
speculation and ensure the investors’ commitment to 
Vietnam. 
 
Despite the government’s goal of equitizing all 
SOCBs by 2010, as of April 2011 only two—
Vietcombank and Vietinbank—had successfully sold 
shares to private investors.  Vietcombank became the 
first SOCB to hold an IPO, selling a 6.5% stake for 
VND 10.5 trillion (USD 652 million) in December 
2007.
21  However, it was unable to attract a single 
strategic foreign investor willing to take a 20% stake, 
a requirement of the bank’s equitization plan.  Be-
cause the bank was not in compliance with the equiti-
zation plan, in December 2009 the government halted 
Vietcombank’s plans to raise an additional VND 1 
trillion (USD 48 million) through the sale of shares to 
existing shareholders.
22   To comply with its equitiza-
tion plan, Vietcombank will reportedly seek strategic 
investors in 2011.
23  Vietinbank successfully sold a 
4% stake to private investors in its December 2008 
IPO, raising VND 1.1 trillion (USD 64 million).
24  In 
January 2011, it sold an additional 10% of its shares 
to the International Finance Corporation, which be-




The equitization status of the remaining SOCBs re-
mains somewhat uncertain.  In April 2010, the gov-
ernment approved an equitization plan for Mekong 
Housing Bank (MHB), through which the bank would 
sell a 15% stake to strategic investors and an addi-
tional 14.34% stake to the public.  However, the gov-
ernment has not yet announced a date for the planned 
IPO, nor has it identified potential strategic inves-
tors.
26  BIDV initially planned to conduct an IPO in 
2008 but twice postponed the sale of shares due to the 
poor performance of the domestic stock market.  The 
bank reportedly plans to conduct its IPO in the second 
half of 2011 and sell up to a 20% stake, 10% of which 
might go to a strategic investor.
27  In February 2009, 
the SBV approved a plan for Agribank to become a 
single-member limited liability company entirely un-
der government ownership.
28  The government has 
not announced a date for the plan’s enactment, nor 
has it indicated whether the government-held shares 
will eventually be sold to private investors.   It also 
remains unclear whether the government will equitize 
the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. 
 
Strengthening Bank Capitalization 
Stronger capital is a key component of reform efforts 
to improve the competitiveness of Vietnam’s domes-
tic banks as foreign presence increases.  The SBV em-
ploys two tools for measuring banks’ capital ade-
quacy.  The first is a minimum nominal amount of 
capital that banks must hold.  This amount varies de-
pending on the type of bank, but it does not automati-
cally adjust upward as banks grow their assets and 
assume more risk.
29   The SBV also requires banks to 
meet a minimum capital adequacy ratio, which meas-
ures total capital as a percentage of risk weighted as-
sets. 
 
The government’s November 2006 Decree 141 in-
creased the minimum notional capital levels required 
of all credit institutions.
30   Specifically, the decree 
required all commercial banks to hold at least VND 3 
trillion (USD 143 million) in capital, up from the 
prior minimum of VND 70 billion (USD 3.3 million).  
(The minimum capital requirement for foreign bank 
branches was left unchanged at USD 15 million.)  To 
monitor compliance with the decree, the SBV re-
quired all banks to submit recapitalization plans for 
approval.  Banks that did not yet meet the require-
ments were required to submit monthly progress re-
ports.  The decree stated that any commercial bank 
that could not meet the requirement by December 31, 
2010, would be forced to merge, have its scope of op-
erations reduced, or have its banking license revoked.  
Twenty commercial banks, including the major banks, 
were able to meet the new requirement by the dead-
line (Figure 3 on next page); however, 29 other com-
mercial banks were unable to do so due in part to the 
poor performance of the stock market and the increase 
in bank share issuance as many institutions sought to 
raise capital simultaneously.  As a result, in January 
2011, the government extended the deadline through 
December 31, 2011.
31  Even with an additional twelve 
months to meet the capital requirement, it will be 
challenging for many smaller commercial banks to 
attract significant investment. 
 
Effective October 2010, the SBV raised the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio to 9% from the 8% previously 
required.
32  Notably, this ratio is one percentage point 
higher than the minimum required under the Basel 
capital framework.  The SBV also increased the risk 
weightings for certain assets, including loans for the purpose of securities investing and real estate business 
purposes.
33  These measures appear aimed at bringing 
the banking sector closer to compliance with the re-
cently proposed capital requirements under the Basel 
III capital framework. 
 
Looking Ahead 
Within a relatively short period of time, Vietnam’s 
banking sector has transitioned from one dominated 
by state-owned commercial banks and no foreign par-
ticipation to one with a more diversified set of market 
participants, including state-owned banks, partially 
privatized banks, joint ventures and foreign institu-
tions.  The growing presence of foreign banks—
through investments in Vietnamese banks and the es-
tablishment of wholly foreign-owned banks—is likely 
to motivate domestic institutions to improve their 
competitiveness and risk management capabilities 
going forward.  Additionally, the government has im-
plemented measures to strengthen the capitalization of 
banks, improving the ability of local banks to weather 
future economic and financial downturns.  These 
measures also move Vietnam closer towards compli-
ance with the international capital standards under the 
Basel framework.  
 
The government faces a number of challenges as it 
moves forward with further reform and development 
of the banking sector.  As the December 2011 dead-
line for the new minimum capitalization requirement 
approaches, competition for capital among banks will 
increase.  This could lead to the merger or closure of 
smaller banks that are unable to meet the new require-
ments.  Capital raising efforts are also likely to be 
made more difficult by recent declines in equity val-
ues.  Lower equity prices may also create difficulties 
for the government as it continues to search for stra-
tegic shareholders to provide investment and exper-
tise to newly equitized SOCBs.  Further, the SBV 
recently announced new limitations on foreign in-
vestment in SOCBs, requiring at least USD 20 bil-
lion in assets for investors wishing to invest in more 
than 15%.  These restrictions could limit the number 




Despite these challenges and obstacles, it is encour-
aging to see the progress the authorities in Vietnam 
have made to diversify the market participants in the 
banking industry, strengthen the resiliency of the 
banking sector, and follow internationally accepted 
banking standards.  The success of further reform 
and development programs will likely depend on 
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The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco is pleased to announce that registration is open for our sympo-
sium on Asian banking and finance, entitled Asian Financial Institutions: Risk Management in a Global 
Environment, on September 8-9, 2011 in San Francisco.  This year's symposium continues our tradition of 
examining emerging trends and issues that will impact banking and financial centers both in Asia and in the 
United States. Specifically, we will examine the complex issues that are part of managing risk in a global 
environment, and how financial institutions in Asia are balancing regulation, risk and innovation. 
The symposium will commence with a keynote address from Mohamed El-Erian, Chief Executive Officer, 
PIMCO. 
To see the full agenda and register online, please visit: 
http://www.frbsf.org/banking/asiasource/events/2011/1109/agenda.html 
Early Bird Registration Rate is $450. 
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